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THE PSYCHIC LIFE OF MICRO-ORGANISMS.
BY GEORGE J. ROMANES.
fThe five Arabic numerals that occur in the
text of Mr. Romanes's contribu-
tion, refer to the remarks of M. Binet. correspondmsl/
indicated,
at the close of the article.—Ed.]
A VKRV few words will now be sufficient to
termi-
nate this correspondence so far as I am
concerned,
seeing that M. Binet's courteous reply in
The Open
C.1URT for November 14th appears to narrow our
pomts
of disagreement almost to vanishing quantities.
Nev-
ertheless, as there are still one or two
matters with
reference to which I fail to understand him, while
there
are two or three touching which he seems to
have mis-
understood me, I will briefly explain what these
mat-
ters are.
Taking first the points which appear to be some-
what obscure on his side, my original criticism con-
sisted in pointing out the insufficient evidence
on which
he relied to prove the occurrence among
"Micro-Or-
ganisms" of the majority oi those emotional and m-
teUectual faculties which are presented by the
higher
mammaha. To this M. Binet now replies m effect,
that he never intended to accredit his
micro-organ-
isms with "consciousness," or, rt >/-/iV, with
"in-
telligence " ; but only with adjustive movements under
the influence of appropriate stimulations,
(i) Now, of
course, if I had understood this in the first
mstance,
there would have been no occasion for my previous
paper in The Open Court ; for no one doubts the fact
that micro-organisms exhibit many adjustive
move-
ments of a simple order, and this fact is fully
recog-
nized in my own books. But I was under the
im-
pression that the whole issue between M.
Binet and
myself had reference to the question whether
or not
the adjustive movements of micro-organisms are
due
to conscious intelligence as distinguished
from uncon-
scious automatism. And I am still unable to perceive
why, if this was not the issue between us, M.
Bmet
should ever have taken me to task for not having
suffi-
ciently accredited the micro-organisms
with those
sundry emotional and intellectual faculties which
in his
own book he most unequivocally assigns to them.
More-
over, although it is perfectly true, as he now
says, that
the phenomena of adjustive movement " may be
studied
from two points of view : from the subjective
mental
point of view, and from the objective material point
of
view " ; it appears to me on this account all the more
necessary that terms and phrases belonging to one of
these points of view should be carefully avoided by
any one who has undertaken to deal with such phe-
nomena from their other point of view. For instance,
we read in M. Binet's book that I have greatly erred
in not expressly accrediting the micro-organisms
with
feelings of fear and surprise; and he adds, "We
may reply upon this point, that there is not a single
infusory that cannot be frightened, and that does
not
manifest its fear bv a rapid flight through the liquid
of
the preparation." Now, if all that M. Binet
meant by
such expressions is, that infusoria will make move-
ments of escape from the presence of stmiulating
agents, why did he not say so in the first instance?
Why did he adduce such movements (touching the
occurrence of which there is no question) as evidence
oifcar .?(2 ) Why did he call his book ' ' The Psychic Life
of Micro-Organisms" ? Or why is the whole of
that
book directed towards a repeatedly expressed
attempt
to prove intelligent action on the part
of such organ-
isms ^ To these questions I confess myself
unable to
supply any answers. But at least it appears
evident
that if he were writing only "from the
objective
material point of view," he can scarcely wonder
that I
should have misunderstood his meaning,
when he
everywhere employs terminology which has
reference
only to " the subjective mental point of view."
Was
he writing a treatise on \h& physiology of
micro organ-
isms ? If so, why does he say that it was a
treatise
o^\\^^\r psychology ? Or, in other words,
is it anything
less than a contradiction in terms to
say, as he now
says " I undertook to write a psychology
of micro-
organisms without concerning myself to
ascertain
whether these low- class creatures were or
were not
conscious of the stimulations they receive
from their
environment, and of the movements of adaptation
they
perform in consequence of these stimulations ?
" Surely
Hamlet without the Prince of Denmark would
be a"
hi-hly finished work, compared with a
psychological
aifalysis which does not concern itself to
ascertain
whether the prime condition to there being
any sub-
ject-matter for such analysis is present or absent. (3)
However, although I am not able to
understand
what M. Binet's original "point of view"
can have
been, I am sincerely glad to find that
he now appears
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to sanction our taking his psychological terminology
as having been intended to bear a metaphorical or
pictorial signification ; not a literal or scientific one.
For, if this be the case, the differences between us
have been reduced," as I have said, to a vanishing
point. I never questioned his facts "from the objec-
tive material point of view" ; I only challenged his in-
terpretation of these "from the subjective mental
point of view"—which, as he now explains, he "had
systematically excluded " from his study of micro or-
ganisms. And, unintelligible though it still remains
to me why, if "the question of consciousness" (and,
a fortiori, of intelligence) were thus "systematically
excluded," it should everywhere have been expressly
included as apparently the precise and particular sub-
ject-matter of his "study," atleast itis satisfactory now
to understand that the differences between us seem to
have resolved themselves into mere matters of termi-
nology.
Turning now to M. Binet's counter-criticisms, I
shall hope to make it clear that they all arise from a
slight misunderstanding of what I have written.
First he thinks I am inconsistent in attributing to
micro-organisms the "psychical faculties" of "ex-
citability, discrimination, and conductility. " But none
of these "faculties," as I have defined them, are "psy-
chical." I use these terms in the sense employed by
physiologists; and although seeing in them "the root-
principles of mind," I am careful to represent that in
my opinion they are not in themselves indicative of
consciousness or intelligence.
The only other point I have to notice has refer-
ence to M. Binet's comments on my "Criterion of
Mind." This criterion is "the power of learning by
individual experience," and it is criticized by M.
Binet on the grounds, as I understand them, that in
applying the criterion we can never be sure whether
in particular cases we may not be excluding the men-
tal elerpent, when in reality this element is, in some
degree, present. But in my book on. "Mental Evolu-
tion in Animals" this criticism is expressly antici-
pated, as the following quotation will sufficiently show.
"It (viz. the Criterion) is not rigidly exclusive
either, on the one hand, of a possibly mental character
in apparently non-mental adjustments, or, conversely,
of a possibly non-mental character in apparently mental
adjustments It is clear that long before mind has
advanced sufficiently far in the scale of organization to
become amenable to the test in question, it has prob-
ably begun to dawn as nascent subjectivity. In other
words, because a lowly organized animal does not learn
by its own individual experience, we may not therefore
conclude that in performing its natural or ancestral
adaptations to appropriate stimuli, consciousness, or
the mind-element is wholly absent; we can only say
that this element, if present, reveals no evidence of
the fact. But, on the other hand, if a lowly organized
animal does learn by its own individual experience, we
are in possession of the best available evidence of con-
scious memory leading to intentional adaptation.
Therefore, our criterion applies to the upper limit of
non-mental action, not to the lower limit of mental. "(4)
It is thus sufficiently apparent that the object of
this criterion was to furnish a practical line of demar-
kation between the subject matter of physiology and the
subject-matter of psychology : not to prove the actual
absence of mind or feeling in any particular cases. It
appeared to me that in writing a treatise on compar-
ative psychology, the first thing to do was to find some
objective principle of discrimination between adjustive
actions which furnish proof of conscious intelligence,
and adjustive actions which fail to furnish any such
proof. And although the objective principle which
seemed to me best for this purpose labors under the
necessary defect of not being able to create any proof
of conscious intelligence in cases where (if present)
such intelligence does not carry its own proof, at least
the criterion is always good for the only purpose in-
tended—viz., preventing the gratuitous attribution of
" psychic life " to any " organisms " which do not pre-
sent any real evidence of its occurrence.
Failing to perceive this the only object of my Cri-
terion of Mind has led M. Binet to find "very difficult
of comprehension" what appears to him a "very
apparent contradiction" in my definition of Instinct.
This is what he says :
" Upon again carefully reading his work on ' Men-
tal Evolution in Animals,' I believe I have come upon
a point, in his definition of instinct, very difficult of
comprehension. On the one hand, Mr. Romanes says,
that 'the only distinction between adjustive move-
ments due to reflex action and adjustive movements
accompanied by mental perception, consists in the
former depending on inherited mechanisms within the
nervous system being so constructed as to effect par-
ticular adjustive movements in response to particular
stimulations, while the latter are independent of any
such inherited adjustment of special mechanisms to
the exigencies of special circumstances.' Further on,
he insists on 'the variable and incalculable character
of conscious adjustments as distinguished from the
constant and foreseeable character of reflex adjust-
ments.' After carefully reading the passage quoted,
one is astounded to find instinct defined as 'reflex
action in which there is an element of consciousness '
.... notwithstanding 'the instinctive action be sim-
ilarly performed under similar circumstances by all the
individuals of the same species.' The contradiction
is very apparent."
Now, the point here is that, unless for some reason
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or another we suppose that there is a conscious element
in any given instinctive action, we have no right or
reason to call it an instinctive action : in the absence
of any such supposition there would be nothing to dis-
tinguish it from reflex action. It is the element of
consciousness, and the element of consciousness alone,
which can be taken to differentiate the phenomena of
instinct from those of purely non-mental adjustment;
and although in particular cases the question may (and
often does) arise whether we ought or ought not to
suppose that an apparently instinctive action is accom-
panied by consciousness of its performance (and there-
fore is really instinctive), this does not affect the valid-
ity of my definition of instinct. In such cases all we
can say is, if the inherited mechanism, while leading
to the performance ,of the action, is associated with
consciousness of the performance, then the action is
instinctive ; if it be not so associated, the action is
reflex. (5)
In conclusion, it remains for me to acknowledge
the personally courteous tone of M. Binet's reply, and
to assure him that I do not appreciate less highly his
important researches in the domain of experimental
psychology, because I have failed to understand his
theoretical views on "the Psychic Life of Micro-Or-
ganisms."
London, November 28th, 1889.
[REFERENCES .
REMARKS BY M. BINET.
(i) Not entirely that; as I shall presently show.
(2) Fear is an especial physiological state which may
or may not be accompanied with consciousness, but
which, in any event, is something more than a move-
ment of escape.
(3) I believe that the study of psychology may be
pursued in the investigation of unconscious states. It
is in this way that psychologists have studied uncon-
scious judgments, that is to say, processes that are
purely physiological. The following is an instance
that will illustrate our point. I press the ball of my
eye at the outer angle of the eye-lids ; a luminous
circle is seen to appear at the side next the nose. The
psychologist explains this localisation by the results
of past experience applied to the interpretation of a
new but similar experience. In other words, analysis
brings to light in the fact in question all the elements
of conscious judgment—a major and minor premise,
and a conclusion ; but since the operation is apparently
not conscious and appears to consist in a simple phys-
iological act, the term unconscious judgment has been
applied to it. Plainly, this is a psychological term-
inology applied to phenomena that are (perhaps) purely
physiological. But what is the harm ? Moreover, I
do not allow the contention of Mr. Romanes, that such
an employment of terms is not a scientific one ; for
everybody is competent to translate the words "un-
conscious judgment" into their equivalent, which is
this: "the material process that accompanies judgment
when judgment is conscious." This point postulated
and thoroughly grasped, it is conceivable how we may
undertake the same task with regard to all psycho-
physiological functions. This is the work I sought to
accomplish in the case of micro-organisms. It is
strange to observe the difficulty Mr. Romanes expe-
riences in comprehending the standpoint from which I
proceeded. It is true, his was quite different. To reca-
pitulate the whole in a single illustration, it may be
said, that if the case before us for study had been that of
the localisation in an animal of the visual sensation of
which I have just spoken, Mr. Romanes would first
have occupied himself with the question whether the
localisation was or was not accomplished ivith con-
sciousness, while I, by preference, would have studied
the mechanism of the operation and its features of
approach to a judgment. Furthermore, it is now cur-
rently admitted in France, as I infer, that unconscious
phenomena have a place in the domain of psychology.
And it could not be otherwise. For if psychologists
refused to concern themselves—for example—with un-
conscious judgments, and to illuminate them by a
comparison with conscious judgments, physiologists,
reduced to their own sole resources, could tell us
nothing about them. In concluding upon this point,
let me recall to mind that I set aside the question of
consciousness in that which pertains to micro-organ-
isms, but I do not intend by any means to place a lim-
itation upon the question in any direction of investiga^
tion. I do not know, and no one, in my judgment,
can know, whether the Micro-Organisms are conscious
or not of the highly complex physiological acts, per-
taining to their life of relation, that they execute under
certain conditions.
(4) The passage quoted does not fully answer my
argumentation. I said, and I maintain, that intro-
spection cannot enable us to ascertain the limits of.our
consciousness, and consequently cannot furnish us
with a criterion of consciousness. It is for this reason
that I reject the criterion of Mr. Romanes, which is
founded upon the data of introspection.
(5) Mr. Romanes has not comprehended my ob-
jection. I shall recapitulate : a. The criterion of con-
sciousness, according to Mr. Romanes, is the power
to learn- by individual experience, b. His definition
of instinct is the power to react in the same manner
under the same conditions for all the animals of the
same species. (Romanes), c. It follows from the
latter definition that instinct does not result from in-
dividual experience and that it presents the charac-
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teristics of an activity incompatible with the idea of
consciousness, d. Accordingly, when Mr. Romanes
admits consciousness as an index of instinct, a con-
tradiction is involved.
Paris, Januar}' 5, 1889.
A CRITICISM OF THE WORK OF " THE OPEN COURT."-
BY HERMANN BOPPE,
Translated from the Freidt-nker.
We have often explained wherein we agree with
the aims proposed by The Open Court and wherein
we differ. We both propose, and strive to attain, the
same end ; but in practice and method differences
appear that are not unessential. We are decidedly
opposed to the pouring of new wine into old vessels,
and we resist every effort to make it appear that
science, that insists inexorably upon truth and firmly
abides by truth, will allow of reconciliation with any
form of ecclesiasticism whatsoever. We would prefer
that a less flexible interpretation might be given to
words and ideas that, through tradition, have acquired
among the people a definitely fixed meaning, and that
their use were rather renounced. We maintain that
such attempts at adaptation are but productive of con-
fusion, that the}' stand in the wa}* of lucidity instead
of introducing it, much less furthering it.
That the address of Mr. Hegeler, in and of itself,
is permeated by a broad and humane spirit, that it con-
tains many a golden word of truth, we readily and
willingly recognize. Nevertheless the charge of in-
consequence is justified. However much "liberality,"
in the effort to establish a point of contact with the
Church, we may show in the employment of the words
"God," " Religion," and the like, still, the science
that the confessing Lutheran, without prejudice to
his church, admits, is something entirely different
from the science of the Monist.\ Little would be left
of the dogmas of the Evangelical-Lutheran Church,
if science, in the judgment of the same, were taken
as sole criterion. A single glance at the Lutheran
catechism would show that such a position and the
facts are not in consonance.
The fact, too, that, apart from the selfishness of the
priesthood, the efforts of churches,—and not only
the Lutheran denomination but also other sects and
creeds,—are generally guided by laudable motives, and
wish the best to humanity, we do not dispute. Never-
theless, Science and the Church are opposites. Eccles-
iastical dogmas conflict with the method and spirit of
scientific research.
' Evoked by the Address of Mr. E. C. Hegele i Court, No. io6.
THE KERNEL OF RELIGION.
A REPLY TO THE CRITICISM.S OF " THE FREIDENKEr" UPON THE AD-
DRESS HELD AT THE ^-AYING OF THE CORNER-STONE OF
THE LA SALLE LUTHERAN CHURCH.
BY EDWARD C. HEGELER.
The Freidenkcr, Vol. V, No. 37, took occasion to
discuss the address I held at the laying of the corner-
stone of the Lutheran Church of La Salle and repro-
duced in its columns the greater part of the same
—
especially the passages in which Christian humilit}',
and prayer as supplication, and the sacraments of the
church, in their traditional sense, are repudiated. A
passage, however, was omitted, that throws light upon
a point criticized : I refer, namely,' to the statement
made, that "a freethinker should not endeavor under
any circumstances to reconcile his principles with an
ecclesiastical system." The concluding paragraph of
my address reads as follows : " And particularly may
this "remain a seat of tolerance as to day it is; of tol-
" erance from those who cling to the olden teach-
"ings towards me who think progressively; of toler-
"ance, too, from such as think like me towards those
"who only with hesitation change the creed of their
"childhood."
A correspondent of the Freidcnker, (in No. 39,)
criticizes the view I take, that "in the most essential
teachings the Christian Religion and Science are not
in opposition." He thinks that they are.*
To this I say in reply :
The substance of religion consists of teachings that
have been derived from experience,—teachings that
stood in harmony with the knowledge of the time in
which they arose. With the increase of knowledge,
the doctrines of religion have also undergone correc-
tion. The question that now presents itself is, whether,
after all corrections made, the true pith and kernel of
the religion that was taught us does not still remain.
And I believe that it does.
I emphasized, in my address, only the most essen-
tial differences between the doctrines of the church
and the religious views that I myself hold. But it is
to be inferred from the very statement of my position,
that there is much additional in the catechism of the
Lutheran church that I cannot accept.
I was never taught that the Mosaic account of cre-
ation must be regarded as the essence of religion, as
your correspondent believes it to be regarded. Only
in my earliest childhood, when I heard the account
from my teacher, did I believe the story of creation.
The instruction I then received—and, as I now think,
* The passage in question reads : " The most important, indeed, the only
fundamental doctrine of the entire Christian "Religion" rests upon the be-
lief in the Mosaic story of creation and " the fall of man."
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with a purpose in view—was not called Religion, but
Biblical Histor}-.
The true kernel of existing religions is this, that
they recognize under the name of God an overwhelm-
ing power that prescribes to man a definite conduct,
and threatens him, if he do not follow it, with punish-
ment and annihilation.
This same power Science finds in Nature ; and b}'
Nature must be understood all that exists, man in-
cluded. For millions of years Nature has been at
work, producing, here on earth, ever higher individ-
uals, and to this end it continues to work, and thus,
we can foresee, it will continue to work for millions of
years to come : and they that do not remain at the
height of progress .reached, will perish. This, the
Darwinian, doctrine harmonizes perfectly with the
kernel of religion, whereas it stands in contradiction to
the results that, among other liberal thinkers, Eng-
land's best known philosopher, Herbert Spencer, has
reached. Spencer believes he has found the object
of religion in an "Unknowable." Being unable to
derive an ethics from the activity of a power that is
unknowable, Spencer seeks to discover the basis of
ethics in the striving after happiness (in the surplus of
pleasure over pain). He believes that mankind will
reach a state of perfection, upon attaining which, con-
flict and destruction, and, consequently, further pro-
gress, will cease. A portion of huriianity,—a given
nation, say,—if it shape its mode of life to harmonize
with what such theories demand, may succeed in at-
taining^for a time the ideal that Spencer has set, but
nature and history tell us, that when such a nation has
arrived at its Arcadian state, it will be engulfed by its
progressive neighbor, or will fall to ruin from some
inner decadence of its own.
The true pith of Protestantism, as taught by the
example of the Reformers, is, that the Protestant him-
self shall pass judgment ; and no priest, bishop, or
synod for him. The position of an Evangelical Lu-
theran pastor, as I view it, is this : that he acquaint
his congregation and their children with the doctrines
of the Christian, and in particular with those of the
Lutheran church, as they are in their genuine form
;
expounding the former standpoint of Science as com-
pared with the standpoint of to-day, and then pre-
senting to his followers, and especially to those accept-
ing confirmation, the views he has reached himself.
His hearers (and particularly the candidates for confir-
mation) are then to judge of their own accord that which
they are to believe. Above all, it is his duty, that
they shall firmly engrave in their souls the unswerving
determination to seek the truth and to tell the truth to
others and to themselves.
The Freidenkerha.s repeatedly affirmed, in editorial
remarks, that it is wrong for freethinkers to retain the
words "God" and '• Religion," and stigmatizes such
a proceeding as "efforts at adaptation."
Adaptation to old words is a necessity. Efforts at
adaptation, however, in the sense of yielding sub-
servience to antiquated ideas, cannot be tolerated.
Words are a part of ourselves. They are structures
of living nerve-substance formed in the brain by edu-
cation. They cannot be taken out, as, for instance,
a tooth can be extracted.
Certainly the reader will sustain me in my position,
that the mind of man is not born with him, but is
formed in our brain by education in its widest sense.
"Man," it has been said, "is the product of educa-
tion." Furthermore, Ludwig Noire and Max Miiller
teach us, that mind (thought) and language are iden-
tical. And accordingly, in order to attain clearness
for myself in matters of thought, and peace within,
I have to employ the old words imprinted in me dur-
ing youth. I was baptized, confirmed, and brought
up in the Evangelical-Lutheran church. The foun-
dations of my mind are consequently liberalized Evan-
gelical-Lutheran ideas—such as my family possessed.
These ideas are definite conceptual and verbal com-
binations, and among these words or concepts the'
words "God," "Religion," "Soul," "Mind," and
"Immortality" are the most prominent. From the
mind of my childhood days, by doctrines afterwards
attached and later on imprinted in me—doctrines
partly corrective — was formed my present mind.
This process took place in me by degress, and the
newly added ideas either worked themselves into, or
fought their way through with the old ideas to a
new harmonious whole. Before that happened, no
inward peace was attained.
With other people it may happen that what is im-
planted in them in youth under the name of religion
is merely mythological vesture. New knowledge came
to them and won the mastery ; the old ways of think-
ing were simply suppressed, without becoming amal-
gamated, after a struggle, with the new ; and a spe-
cies of double religious personality, made up of two
irreconcilable view-points, is formed in their brain,
whereof the older one, which, at the time, is the weaker,
is held in subjection by the more recent one. They do
not speak with one another. And, as the pathology of
the memory teaches, in old age the personality formed
in the brain in youth again easily acquires the upper
hand.
We that have thus been educated cannot otherwise
identify Nature with the idea of God than by calling
nature God. We must speak it out in words, "Nature
or God," until it automatically repeats itself in us.
Unless we do this, an inward voice will ever remain
within us, and when we speak of nature, that voice will
say, be it ever so softl)-, " there is something higher
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still." I have accustomed m^'self, of recent years, to
put the word "All" in the place of the pantheistically
used expression " God "; yet, at the word "All," I long
had to add, softly, as in explanation to myself, " God
and the World," or God and the Universe, which are
the same.
If we call Nature God, and convey therewith the
meaning, that nature is the highest that is, then by the
word "God" we signify something real. So with the
words "I" and "reason." To them, too, there is still
a superstitious notion commonly attached. Yet we
must continue to retain the words "I" and "reason,"
for the sake of that in them which is real, after the er-
roneous has been cast away.
The word "I" now stands for the hand of the
speaker, now for his foot ; and now again for an idea,
which, just as in the wax of the phonograph, so in the
living protoplasm of his brain is imprinted in con-
nected links of words.
This, too, is the teaching of the modern Science of
Language: "No Thought Without Words." Ideas
composed of combinations of words are reasonable
when the)' conform to Reality ; when they do not thus
conform they are unreasonable. The words "five times
seven are five-and- thirty " are reasonable, because they
accord with reality ; as often as they are repeated, they
never come into conflict therewith, and they thus ever
become more firmly imprinted. We may, indeed, put
together the words "five times seven are six-and-
thirty"; but they do not, in that case, accord with re-
ality, they come into conflict with every experience
and memory of ours, and this word-structure that
has formed has consequently no element of lasting-
ness. Theories of reason that connect with reason
anything beyond this, anything that is at all myste-
rious, are superstition.
]n conclusion let me add that I deem it of the ut-
most importance to retain of the belief in the immor-
tality of the soul or the mind, and to guide into the
right channels, that thereof which is true. The true
belief in the immortality of the soul is, I think, the
highest of the ideas that jointly constitute the soul,
and the strongest factor in its struggle for existence.
[For the exposition of my doctrine of the soul see the
extracts from former essays, appended to this article.]
Mind, or Soul, is not a mystical something, a bodi-
less essence, a spiritual hobgoblin : It is the form-
structure of our brain produced by our education, in
the widest sense in which that term is used. This
structure of form is not mere nothingness. The idiot
does not possess it. The special form is here a more
important part of reality than the substance that has
taken the form. In the Sistine Madonna of Raphael,
the form in which the colors have been distributed
upon the canvas is the principal thing and not the
color taken from the painter's palette. In a ball of
lead that which we call the ball is as real as the lead.
The form-structure of the human brain, the soul of
man, is the result of the work and struggle of the liv-
ing world on earth for millions of years. To preserve
this work-of-art of nature's making, and to develop it
to a higher form in the rising generation, seems to me
to constitute the main duty of our life. // is the con-
tent of all morals. And the mightiest instigation to
such a preservation of the soul seems to me to be the
conviction that we thereby again build up ourselves.
SUPPLEMENTARY.
S ESSAYS OF MR. E. C. HEGELER, ILLUSTR^
POSITION OF THE FOREGOING ARTICLE.]
"The soul is the form of a very complicated, self-
acting mechanism of living matter, which feels in a
part of the living substance which is in action ; the
feelings correspond \nform to the most essential parts
of the mechanism."
" Feelings are of different intensity, as one pain is
stronger than another. Single feelings may be of
longer or shorter duration, and between them there
may be definite intervals of time. Feelings also differ
among themselves as various tastes or odors, or as
those accompanying different musical notes. In this
way I speak of the feelings I have on hearing a melody,
as corresponding to the geometrical form of the line in
the tin foil of a phonograph that records it.
" If I am familiar with the melody, I hold that living
atoms in my brain have arranged themselves in a form
analogous to the longitudinal section of the scratch in
the tin-foil on my previously hearing it. This chain
of atoms is stimulated by and then feels the melody,
that is, is conscious of it. Separate chords of the
melody awaken other memories ; the melody com-
bines them."
*
.
^-
" This is what I take a perception to be : If a child
sees an apple for the first time, the lens of the eye will
throw a photograph of it on the retina, which photo-
graph, as we now know, is fixed there for a short time,
in a similar way as in a photographer's camera. From
this photograph, through nerve-fibres, an analogue of
the photograph is assumed to be brought to the gray
matter of the child's brain, making a record there
upon living, feeling matter; this has received the name
photogram—in this case the photogram of an apple."
"So if the child sees the apple again at another
time, it is the living, feeling photogram of an apple
resultingfrom its first sight, which is stimulated there-
by and feels, or, as we say, becomes conscious of the
apple. This photogram is the ego, for the instant."
I regard the feeling called consciousness, which
accompanies the motions of the brain- structures, as a
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passive phenomenon. To use the simile of Huxley, it
is like a shadow that attends the movement of an
object.
" In our whole body, and so in the mechanisms in
our brain, the feeling (conscious), living matter is
constantly renewed by new feeling, living matter of
the same kind. The new living atoms constantly
enter into the relative positions of those which they
replace, thus preserving the form of the mechanisms,
and with that our memor}'.
" I imagine I had died and another man was formed
of living matter, so that in him the atoms were in the
same relative position as in me ; he would be my con-
tinuance, he would be the same man that I am, as I
am the same man that I was yesterday; he would
know all I know, would know every person I know
and would be known as I am. He would feel as I do,
would act as I do under thg same circumstances,
would give the same answer to the same question
;
he would have the same character, the same con-
science, the same morals, he would have my soul.
" Can we thus renew ourselves? Yes, we can to a
great extent. We can form our soul again in the
growing generation through education and example,
individually and collectively."
'
' What the human soul is has been made clear to me
principallj' by the leading German author of our time
—
Gustav Freitag. He propounds his view of the im-
mortality of the soul in a dialogue which takes place
between Professor Werner and his wife Use. Standing
before the shelves of his library he says about the
books :
'
' 'They are the great treasure-keepers of the human
race. They preserve all that is most valuable of what
has ever been thought or discovered from one century
to another, and they proclaim what was once existing
upon the earth.'
" And further on the Professor explains how the
souls of men actually are in books :
"'Since the invention of books almost all that we
know and call learning is to be found in them. But
that is not all,' he continued in a whispering tone
;
'few know that a book is something more than simply
a product of the creative mind, which its author sends
forth as a cabinet-maker does a chair that has been
ordered. There remains attached, undoubtedly, to
every human work something of the soul of the man
who has produced it. But a book truly contains under
its cover the real soul of the man. The real value of
a- man to others—the best portion of his life—remains
in this form for the next generation, perhaps to the
most distant future. Moreover, not only those who
write a good book, but those whose lives and actions
are portrayed in it, continue in fact living among us.
We converse with them as with friends and oppo-
nents ; we admire and contend with, love or hate them,
not less than if they dwelt bodily among us. The
human soul that is inclosed in such a cover becomes
imperishable on earth, and therefore we may say : In
the book lasts on the soul-life of the individual, and
onl)' the soul which is incased in a book has reliable
duration on earth.'*
"' But error persists also,' said Use, 'and so do
liars and impure spirits if they betake themselves into
a book.'
" ' They undoubtedly do, but are refuted by better
souls. Very different, certainly, is the value and im-
port of these imperishable records. Few maintain their
beauty and importance for all .times ; many are only
valuable for a later period, because we ascertain from
them the character and life of men in their days, while
others are quite useless and ephemeral. But all books
that have ever been written, from the earliest to the
latest, have a mysterious connection. For no one who
has written a book has of himself become what he is ;
every one stands on the shoulders of his predecessor ;
all that was produced before his time has helped to
form his life and soul. Again, what he has produced
has in some sort formed other men, and thus his soul
has passed to later times. In this way the contents of
all books form one great soul empire on earth, and all
who now write, live and nourish themselves on the
souls of the past generations.
'' ' From this point of view the soul of mankind is
one interminable unity. Every single individual be-
longs to it—he who lived and worked in past times as
well as he who now breathes and creates new ideas.
The soul which people of past generations felt as their
own was and is still transmitted to others. What has
been written to-day will to-morrow, perhaps, be the
possession of many thousand strangers. Who long
ago returned his body to nature, continues to live on
earth in an unceasingly renewed existence, and comes
to new life again daily in others.'
"'Stop,' cried Use, entreatingly, 'i am bewil-
dered.'
" ' I tell you this now, because I feel myself an un-
ostentatious worker in this earthly soul-empire. This
feeling gives me a pleasure in life which is indestructible,
and it also gives me both freedom and modesty. For
whoever works with this feeling, whether his powers
be great or small, does so not for his own honor, but
for all. He does not live for himself, but for all, as
all who have existed, continue to live for him." '
* In thetransialion of the quotations from Gustav Freitag I liave used the
word soul for the German word " Grist." I might have translated " Geisi " by
'
" spirit " or by " mind," but the word " soul " expresses truly what I under-
stand the author to mean by the word " Gei'it."
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TWO PERILS OF THE INDO-EUROPEAN.
BY PROF E. D. COPE.
The question of sex is a more delicate one, which
men would mostly prefer to evade, were it not that it
is being thrust upon us with more and more persistency
every year. And there are not a few men who, as the}'
say, are "willing to try the experiment" of woman-
suffrage principally to get rid of the subject, and trust-
ing to luck to come out all right, and that we will, after
all, "light on our feet." But the question resembles
that of race in this respect, tha't if the propositions of
the advocates of sex equality in the national govern-
ment are once incorporated into our constitutions, it
will be difficult to get them out. As with negro-suffrage,
the political party that gains by the change will insist on
the execution of the law to the letter, and disorder of
a serious character will result, when the working of
the law is found to be intolerable. The original
question will be lost sight of, as in our late war of
secession. How many of the men engaged in that
struggle on the side of the North would have entered
it to suppress slavery alone? But a small proportion.
The greater number fought to "suppress the rebellion,"
and to maintain the integrity of our common country.
No matter how developed the race of man, the rela-
tion of sex remains the same. The ovarian cell and
the spermatozoon are always represented in the char-
acteristics of body and mind in woman and man. In
the one the conservative habit ; the preponderance of
the element of nutrition, and of the persistent type of
personal benevolence ; in the other the, stimulating
energy, the self-sustaining enterprise, that brings dis-
covery and invention. The male creates, the female
preserves. On these bases are built a complex of
mental organisms which, while parallel, are different,
and while equally good as a whole, are riot both equally
good for particular functions. Women reason, and
reason is always reason. But they do not reason as
much as men, and their reason in extremis yields to
their affections. This quality utterly excludes that
sex from effectiveness as executives of purely imper-
sonal laws, and alwaj'S will. It cannot be otherwise,
nor ought it to be otherwise. The human species can-
not spare women from the beneficient role they fill, to
assume another where they cannot shine. Women
may often perceive the aims of government, but it is
men who must be relied on to secure those aims. The
force, the endurance, and the emotional indifference
which are necessary to the task, are the heritage of the
man and not of the woman.
Of course there are many men who do not come up
to this standard of their sex. Men brought up in ease
and luxury frequently have no opportunity to show
the stuff of which they are made ; and the lack of emo-
tional stimulus to their lives, gives them the appear-
ance of a lack of productive energy. Several genera-
tions of this kind of life may very probably emasculate
men, so that their true sex-qualities are almost entirely
overgrown by a negative mask, which displays a re-
semblance to the woman, but which lacks the vital and
mental vigor which belongs to her in her own field. A
pitiable imitation indeed ! And we now obtain a
glimpse of the second danger that threatens our race ;
viz. : the possibility of the effeminization of men, and
the masculinization of women. For one of these con-
ditions is a natural consequence of the other. • When
men become effeminate, women are more or less com-
pelled to supply the places in daily life that are left
vacant by them. And thus we get counterfeits of both
sexes, each a fraud to the other, and both together
frauds before the world and the universe ! For the one
can never become the other, let them try ever so
diligently. Nature settled that matter so long ago,
that everything else will disappear save life itself, be-
fore the fundamental difference can be eradicated. It
seems to be forgotten that the development of women
is not the masculinization of woma/i, and that her edu-
cation cannot change her sex nor her fundamental
qualities. It is one of the functions of science to teach
this truth, and it should be taught in view of the ignorance
or incredulity which prevails on this question. Men
fear to grant women the best educational facilities
lest they lose her. Women seek those facilities that
they may become the equals of men. Both are equally
wrong. Nature's well-established sex-types cannot be
changed, and evolution which carries both sexes with
it, maintains the relation between them with which it
commenced. But if both sexes begin to believe in an
equality which does not exist, they will be dis-
illusioned, and by a process which cannot be a pleasant
one.
The first step in the process of sex confusion is to
be found in the woman-suffrage movement. It is an
expression of the discontent of many women with the
condition of their sex. Some of this discontent is
justifiable, and some of it is not. It is fair to claim
equal educational facilities with men, and this claim
is being granted, but not with the promptitude that
the occasion demands. It is fair that women should
have the right of separation from intolerable husbands ;
a right which they have in some states, while in others
they have not. It is fair that they should be supported
by husbands so long as they live with them, and this
right they have everywhere. It looks fair that a
woman should be protected in her property rights
when married ; but it is a difficult point to decide how
far law should go in giving a wife such a position, as
will enable the husband to defraud his creditors. But
these, are minor matters compared with the complaints
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we hear of the general " subjection " in which women
are held, and the injustices to which they have to sub-
mit. And the only cure for these ills is to obtain equal
political rights, and then woman will gain her true
position, and man will no longer be able to play the
tyrant over her as heretofore.
I venture to say that nearly all the ills that women
suffer from in their relation with men, arise from their
want of faith in their own femininity, and their attempts
to adopt masculine methods in the procurement of their
desires. And rvVc 7'ersi7 ; the unkindness or hardness
on the part of men, of which some women complain,
is due to the fact that the husband thinks that his wife
is for the time being not a true woman, or fears that
she may become something unwomanly. On the other
hand the discontent of a woman with her husband is
justifiable, when he ceases to be a man ; when he
follows the guidance of passion rather than of reason,
and is weak when he should be strong. But all this
will not be improved by the attempt of the sexes to
change places. The proposition is simply an aggrava-
tion of the disease, and is the worst possible solution
of the difficulty. The cultivation by each sex of its
true characters furnishes the real remedy, and the
result will be that mutual admiration and respect which
makes love imperishable, and which is the guarantee of
vigorous vitality of both body and mind.
Many men have declared that they have owed their
success in life to their wives, a statement no doubt
true, and yet one easily misunderstood. In some
sense most men owe their success in life to some
woman. Without a wife most men are discontented and
unstable, both good reasons for failure. The reponsi-
bilities of marriage, and the demands of affection
form the very basis of male industry. And in the
field of intellectual effort proper, some men owe much
to the ambition of their wives ; the stimulus they im-
part is of a telling description, and it has made many
a man a far more important person than he would
have been without it. John Stuart Mill acknowledged
this in the most ample way
;
yet neither he nor many of
the others of the claimants for sex-equality, seems to
have asked whether the women in such cases could
have carried out and performed the work of which
they were more or less the inspiration. Unless Mr.
Mill was a dishonest plagiarist Mrs. Mill did not, and
could not have written his books.
And the above paragraph expresses in petto the
actual function which woman will ever fulfill in aiding
human progress through grown men. She will suggest
reforms, and stimulate to great labors and heroic
deeds ; but she will not perform them herself to any
considerable extent. In her natural office as stimu-
lator and proposer, she will and does not unfrequently
make impracticable and even absurd propositions.
Witness the vigorous efforts to prevent men frcm
drinking wine and smoking tobacco in moderation.
See also the propositions sometimes made to abolish
marriage laws, on the false supposition that the latter
are made entirely in the interests of men (!).
There are men who, recognizing the virtues of
women, think that on this account they should be
clothed with the functions of men, and they labor with
good will to bring about that result. Some of these
men are effeminate and long-haired ; others do not
understand the logical consequences of what they pro-
pose, nor would they recognize them until they stared
them in the face. Should a' spirit of revolt become
general among women, every woman so affected would
have to pass through a life-lesson in order to under-
stand the real inwardness of the question. This would
cost her and one or more men their happiness for a
shorter or longer time, and cause the raising of a lot
of bad children. Should the nation have an attack of
this kind", like a disease, it would leave its traces in
many after-generations. During its time "a man's
foes would be those of his own household." How
many such households have been already created b)'
the woman'.;-3uffrage movemjnt, and its attendant
discussions cannot be well determined. With domes-
tic discord comes degradation of the sex-relation, for
the chief beauty of the relation has departed. With-
out this both man and woman live on a distinctly
lower plane. Man especially suffers and becomes a
barbarian more or less veneered. Women's sufferings
then begin over again ; and ages might pass before
she would recover the place she had lost. Need the
lesson be carried further? Woman's stronghold is the
sex character of her mind. With that she is the
mistress of the world ; but if she once abdicates it,
she becomes the slave of the man, who will then re-
gard her for her body only. Let us have no more
feminine men or masculine women.
THE SOUL OF THE UNIVERSE.
If we understand by the "soul of a thing" the
formative principle which gave and still gives shape
to it so as to make it the thing it is, we use the word
soul in quite a legitimate j'et in a broader sense than
is usual. The laws that rule the changes and forma-
tions in the world, are not material things, yet they
are realities nevertheless. When we call them reali-
ties, we do not mean that they are entities which exist
of themselves, nor are they mysterious powers outside
of or behind things. They are in the things and are
part of the things ; and it is through the mental pro-
cess of abstraction that we acquire an insight into them.
The universe does not consist of matter alone, but
of the relations among things, the forms of things, and
their changes, also. The so-called laws are formulas
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only, abstracted from many instances, and summing up
their common features, so as to enable us to recognize
in a general survey the regularity that prevails in the
innumerable variations of all the particular and special
cases. Although the relations among things and their
forms are not palpable concrete objects, they are of
greatest concern, for it is the form that makes a thing
what it is. The form is the soul of the thing, and the
possibility of all higher life, all intellectual existence,
and all ethical aspirations depends upon the evolutions
of forms. The practicabilit}' of ideals rests upon the
feasability of a new arrangement of things, upon the
possibility 6f a re-formation of ourselves as well as the
world around us.
Taking this view of the importance of form and
using the word soul to signify the formative factors of
the various forms and their relations that have been
evolved and constantly are evolving and re-evolving ;
we are naturally led to the conception of a soul of the
universe. The soul of the universe we call God.
God, accordingly, is to be conceived as the law
that shaped and is still shaping the world, that is
forming and ever re-forming, evolving and ever re-
evolving the universe. God is the factor that produced
the solar system out of the concourse and whirl of the
nebula. God is the factor that created vegetable and
animal life upon earth. He is the light of mentality
that flashes up in consciousness and finds its divinest
expression in the clear thought of articulate speech.
God is the moral law that binds human society and
leads it to ever grander ideals, to always higher goals
and aspirations. God in one word is the stirsiim that
everywhere animates nature, the upward and forward
tendency that manifests itself in the natural growth
of things and in the progress of evolution.
If after millions of millenniums—long after the time
when humanity, tired of life, has disappeared from
the earth—the solar-system should break to pieces
and be scattered as cosmic dust among the other solar
systems of the universe, our present world would be
destroyed, but its life would not be extinct. The
scattered parts would roam about through cosmic space
as comets. Some of such comets, rushing, the one
upon the other, according to the law of gravitation,
would blaze out in a gorgeous conflagration and produce
a new centre of attraction for the cosmic dust that is
to be gathered in the new forming nebula. God does
not die with the break-up of a solar system. The
formative power of the universe will prove itself active
again and again. It is a living presence indestruct-
ible and eternal. The formative law of the world is
as eternal as are matter and energy.
In approaching the idea of God from this side we
gain more than one advantage over all the methods
employed by other philosophers and theologians. The
greatest advantage I deem to be, that we need not give
up the principle of Positivism [as explained in a for-
mer article (in No. 121) of ours] ; we need not leave
the secure and firm ground of positive facts. God as
defined by us is no mere fancy of our mind, no crea-
ture of our imagination. He is a reality of actual life,
a reality whose presence in the universe is as unde-
niable as the quality of gravity in matter, and whose
manifestation is as demonstrable as the correctness of
the rule (<? + by ^ a^ + 2 ad + 6^ in mathematics.
We may mention points of secondary advantage
also. By conceiving God as we do, we enter the
domain of science and can state, according to scien-
tific methods, what God is like, and what he is not
like. - We propose positive issues which can be in-
vestigated and discussed impartially sine ira ac studio.
We can arrive at results based upon scientific inquiry,
results that are beyond the trivial impositions of private
opinions and personal authorities. Private opinions,
suggestive thoughts, sermons full of sentiment, be
they ever so ingenious and beautiful, are after all
empty talk and vain repetitions.
Thus we get rid of the useless controversies with
atheists as well as with dogmatists ; the latter stating
a-priori that by an act of special revelation they are in
possession of the only true idea of God, and the former
stating a-priori that there is no God, because they do
not believe in the God of the dogmatists.
The objection may be made that God as here de-
fined is no God, but a natural law ; that he is a principle
of all-importance, but not necessarily a deity, as are
the gods worshiped by Heathens and Mohammedans
and Christians. To this objection we answer, that
whether we name the creative, i. e., the formative,
factor of the world God or not, whether we call it the
soul of the universe or anything else, it remains as
it is, and indeed it remains of equal all importance.
For it is that formative power, that creative principle,
that life giving law, in which, as St. Paul beautifully
says, we live and move and have our being.
We have after a long consideration adopted, or
rather re-adopted, the word God as a signification of
this highest reality in the world, for there is no con-
ception of God, be it ever so pagan and anthropomor-
phic, that does not contain a noticeable endeavor to
express this our idea of the world-soul, of the creative
principle of the cosmos and the life of the cosmos.
The idea of God signifies at the same time in every
religion the standard of morality and the highest au-
thority, which must be obeyed. God is that law in life
which visits the iniquity of the evil-doer unto the third
and fourth generation, and which blesses the righteous
unto the thousandth generation. And in this respect our
conception of God is not at all different from that of
former times. Those among freethinkers who are
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pleased to call themselves atheists, lack a proper word
and often they do not even feel the need of one for
expressing the authority or norm according to which
they regulate their rules of conduct. If there is a
difference of importance between our view and that
of dogmatic orthodoxy, it is this, that the conception
of God as proposed by us from the standpoint of a
positive philosophy, is free from all anthropomorphism.
Theologians claim that this highest reality of the
world, the soul of the universe, its formative law, must
be supposed to have been fashioned by a great per-
sonal being, by an omnipotent God. But in this they
show their misapprehension of the independence and
inherent necessity of natural and of formal laws. They
are like children that look upon their teacher as the
author of the multiplication-table. Some one, they
think, must have arranged and fixed these tables, that
such order and harmony and proportion could be in
them. Theologians think there is a God above the
God of the Universe who created the divinity of the
Cosmos. But the divinit}' of the Cosmos, its order
and harmony, is a God so divine that he cannot have
been created or produced.
We are in no need of such an hypothesis. We
can better do without the assumption of a supernatural
arithmetician, who so arranged the formal laws and
dictated them to the atoms that they would obey them.
For we know that the formal laws are necessary in
themselves. They could not be otherwise than they
are. Their harmony is intrinsic and immanent. The
order which they naturally produce cannot have been
imposed upon them by the ukase of a personal master,
be he ever so great. There is no way out of this, and
therefore the idea of a personal God, of an extramun-
dane author of the immanent God as the soul of the
universe, is untenable.
What is a person but a human individual? And
what is an individual but a thing which, if broken or
divided, ceases to be that which it is? A quartz-crystal
is an individual ; if you crush it, it ceases to be a crystal,
and is mere grains of sand. A plant may, but
need not, be an individual. There are plants that
you can cut in twain, and each part represents all the
characteristic features of that plant. Some plants are
individuals, and if divided, will grow into individuals
again ; each part will continue to grow and perfect
itself. Most animals are individuals, but there are
some that are not individuals, some that can be divided
and will continue to live. Amoebas, properly speak-
ing, are not individuals ; they are lumps of living
matter—mere specimens of animal life.
A person is the highest type of an individual ; it is
an individual that in its activity does not depend upon
simple reflex-motions only, but can regulate its
actions with the assistance of former experiences and
under consideration of probable results. Thus a per-
son is an individual that should not and need not
follow the impulse of the moment, but can look freely
around into the past as well as the future. We can,
accordingly, make a person responsible for his action.^,
we can expect him to use the advantages which he
enjoys. In short, a person is an individual endowed
with freedom of action and moral responsibility.
Every individual, and more so every person, pos-
sesses a special idiosyncrasy ; an individual is of a
particular form and limited in space and time. Every
individual at the same time possesses a soul of its
own ; its formative principle makes a unit of it, it
organizes it into a microcosm. The microcosm of
individual existence, it is true, represents the order of
the macrocosm upon a smaller scale, and it could not
be different, for every individual has grown out of the
cosmic universe. How can it be otherwise than created
in the image of the whole cosmos? Man, being a
microcosm, has a right to shape his idea of God, of
the soul of the macrocosm, after his own likeness, for
the human soul cannot but be a part, an exponent, a
revelation of the soul that pervades the All. Yet in
fashioning our idea of God after the pattern of our
own soul, we must be careful not to select those
characteristic features which are individual and belong
to the limitedness of our existence. We must select
those which are not limited, those which show the
universality of God ; we must not select the properly
human, but the divine, not the transient, but the eter-
nal, not the fleeting and unstable, but the immutable,
the permanent and the everlasting. The blossom is a
revelation of the whole tree, so is every leaf ; but the
blossom is a more perfect revelation. Says the blos-
som : "I am made in the image of the tree. Accord-
ingly the tree is one huge blossom. He is just like
me and not like the leaves." Let us beware of such
narrowness.
God, as I conceive him to be, is not less than a
person, but more than a person. The frailty of per-
sonality does not apply to him ; there is no limitation,
no individuality, no distinct idiosyncrasy about him.
We welcome the idea that God is no person, but a
law ; not a being adaptable to circumstances, but an
irrefragable authority ; no deified egotism but the om-
nipotent power of All-existence ! This idea is the
republican conception of theology which can conceive
of order and of law without a Prince, and of religion
without the fetish of anthropomorphism.*
We have no objection to representing the moral
law of the Universe to which we have to conform, as
a person. We may compare it to a father, and with
Christ call it -'Our I'ather," just as we like to speak
* The two last paragraphs are reprinted Uom r
No. 125 of The Open Coi/rt.
Dr. F. E Abbot
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of Mother Nature. But we wish to have it understood
that this expression is a simile only— a simile which,
if carried out, will lead to serious misconceptions.
p. c.
CORRESPONDENCE.
GOETHE AND THE MARRIAGE RELATION.
To the Eilitor of The Open Court :
—
I.N view of Mrs. Channing's latest communication I am per-
haps called upon to define somewhat more clearly the point of
view frorn which I wrote you my recent letter about Goethe. One
may of course say that Goethe was not legally married in 17SS.
One may say that the woman who from that time presided over h's
house, became the affectionate mother of his children, and was
known to himself and his friends as his wife, was not his wife, but
his mistress. There are people who do not shrink from applying
this name to George Eliot. But I do shrink from applying it in such
cases. It seems to me that the essence of marriage, at least for
the purposes of an ethical discussion, is fully attained in the coha-
bitation of one man with one woman in mutual indelity and love
until death do them part. As to the ceremonial form which in-
augurates such a union, it may not be unimportant, but it varies
with time and place and its value to society consists chiefly in the
help it affords average couples in being faithful. It does not im-
part the ethical quality of the relation. Such a union as that of
George Henry Lewes with Marian Evans is much better entitled
to be associated in our minds with whatever of high sentiment
gathers about the word " marriage " than are half the weddings
constantly celebrated about us with full benefit of clergy.
Now in this view of the matter Goethe was a married man
from 1788 The ceremony of 1806 changed nothing in his life and
character ; he went on living as he had been living. The ceremony
simply gave his wife and children their legal stitus as such and
was a formal public recognition of duties and responsibilities which
he had long privately performed.
I hope no one w 11 understand me as defending the conscience-
marriage of Goethe or of anybody else. Any m n makes a mis-
take when in showing his independence of conventional idea^ he
does that which compromises not simply himself but others whose
fate is linked with his, and who may be less able than he is to bear
opprobrium. Goethe made this mistake. In due time he saw it,
and did what he could by deed and word to make reparation What
I urge is only this : That in judging the conduct of a man like
Goethe, a man whose life, taken as a whole, was lived upon a very
high plane of aspiration and endeavor, and whose con ributions
to the science and the art of right living are simply priceless to the
modern world, we should take the broad historical view of par-
ticular acts which, from our standpoint, we must disapprove. Try
any great historical character by standards which were not his
standards, and it is easy to condemn him. If Socrates were now
living in Chicago, the authorities would certainly not give him
hemlock for corrupting youth ; but they would very likely regard
him as a street-loafer and an intolerable bore and might lock him
up for vagrancy
So when we come to look historically at the Goethe of 17SS,
we are not at a loss for an explanation of his conduct. Hehadjust
returned from Italy. Hellenism and Spinoza had replaced the
pietistic leanmgs of his youth. The sanctions and sacraments of
the church had come to have for him only an historical and aesthetic
interest. The French revolution was in the air. The Aiifklarimg
of the eighteenth century was in its full glory. The traditional
ordinances of society were being examined in the light of reason,
and here and there the foundations seemed to be crumbling. No
one could foresee the future. Gifted men and women were waver-
ing in their views of the marriage relation and were putting their
ideas into practice. What wonder then that Goethe, feeling him-
self at best somewhat out of sympathy with the German public and
chafing under what just then seemed the narrowness of civic life
and the pettiness of conventional notions in his own land, should
have been carried too far in his spirit of independence and have
been led to take a step which we can now see, and which he him-
self a little later saw, to have been a mistake ?
Mrs. Channing seems 10 make something of the point that
Goethe's wife was in "no way his social or intellectual equal. " But
surely we must concede to a man the right to choose his own wife,
and if a man of intelligence occasionally prefers a wild rose to a
jacqueminot, let us criticize his taste if we will, and fire our fami-
liar Latin proverb at him, but let us not think his taste necessarily
evidence of moral depravity. For th i rest it should be said that
Frau G :ethe has been a very much maligned woman. Her letters
just published in the last vo'ume of the Goelhc-JoJirliuili do not, to
be sure, suggest a woman of genius, but they certainly convey no
suggestion of coarseness or vulgarity. She appears as a sprightly,
affectionate woman, of a fair order of mental ability, by no means
dead to her husband's intellectual life, and eagerly doing her best
to make his home pleasant and to further his interests She was
very much the sort of woman that German men of letters to this
day like to have for a wife.
Mrs. Channing supposes that I "belong to that class of
Goethe's admirers who, as Bebel says, read without the slightest
moral indignation, how Goethe wasted the warmth of his heart
and the enthusiasm of his great soul on one woman after another."
Well, if the indictment were true, I should, I daresay, be properly
indignant. But the simple truth is that all such statements as
that quoted are absurdly extravagant and unhistorical. Goethe
passed his youth in an epoch of emotional expansion and uni-
versal gush. It was the fashion of young people to wear their
hearts upon their sleeves, and to make a parade of their emotions.-
Goethe was a "man of feeling" like the rest. In his old age he
concluded to dress up the reminiscences of his youth in an auto-
biographical romance. In publishing Dichtiing iind Wahiiteit, he
not only misled many people with regard to facts, but he set the
vogue for a manner of talking about his " love-affairs," both the
earlier and the later, which has given them an altogether factitious
prominence in the story of his life When we come to read of
these " attachments " in the light of contemporary documents, we
find some things to wonder at, a good deal to be amused over, but
precious little which calls for the heavy artillery of " moral indig-
nation." Expressions like that qu ted nearly always go back to a
reading of DicJitung mid Wahi-hcit by some one who has not
learned to distinguish the Dicliliing from the Wahiheit.
" Goethe neither in his life nor works idealizes love." Really
that is a very hard saying. An editor of " Torquato Tasso " may
be excused for feeling a trifle weary at the \ery thought of tilting
at //in/ proposition.
" Werther and Faust were of the earth earthy." This strikes
me as a very faulty account of the facts. It is the key to the
character of Faust that he has " /tco souls in his breast." Do
the lines
" Du i-egst und riihist ein kiattiges Beschliessen
Zum hochsien Dasein imrnerfort zu strebea,"
sound "of the earth earthy " ? Such a j udgment as Mrs. Channing's
can only rest on isolated passages, and if we make up our verdict
in that way, we shall find Romeo of the earth earth-y, and Othello,
and the Iliad, and the Nibelungenlied. If Mrs. Channing really
means only that n// poetry which touches the passii n of love upon
its sensual side is unsuitable reading for children, I do not know
that I should cire to express dissent ; though personally I had
rather trust a pure-minded boy or girl absolutely in the hands of
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the great poets than to turn him or her loose in a library of modern
Sunday-school fiction. I had rather that the pyramid of the
moral sentiment have a broad base than a fine point. Still I do
not press this opinion, it is one upon which thoughtful parents
might disagree. The idea to which I took exception was that
among the great poets Goethe should be labelled as particularly
dangerous to the young. And here my position was and is, that
if by the "young" We mean children, these do not and cannot
read the kind of literature we are talking about. If any of it
should get into their hands they would not understand it. But if
by ihe " young" we mean youth who have begun to //«'«*, even a
little, of what they read, then I urge that the study of the great
poets who see life as it is and depict it as they see it, will act in
the long run, in spite of the incidental lubricili-;s which occur in
the book only because they occur in life, as a moral tonic. This
position seems to me to be impregnable for any one who holds to
the possibility of a scientific ethics ; or believes as I do, and as I
understand The Open Court to believe, that the art of right liv-
ing can find a permanently satisfactory basis in nothing ehe than
the science of life. Respectfully Yours,
Ann .\rbor, Jan. i8, iSgo. Calvin Thom.\s.
GOD AND NATURE
To Ihe Editor of The Open Court :
—
1 H.^vE read your reply to Dr. Abbot, in which I mainly agree
entirely with you. And ye^ I do not quite like that phrase of yours,
"God is that power of the All which has produced us, etc." I
think you do not mean to say God is any special manifestation or
potency of the All, although you seem so to say ; but rather that
of the Infinite All we are certain manifestations or processes. Do
you not totally identify God and the All ? In other words, the All
as related to us is Law or God. The larger our outlook or knowl-
edge, the more we know of law. Obedience to what we recognize
as right creates in us the conception of morals, that is obligation.
In that proportion or degree the All-Life, which is no person at
all. bears special relations of obligation to us. and to us sustains a
personal relation. We may therefore address the All as Father.
At this point the great mass of people must take up their emotions
and thought ; and the words of Jesus are wise and beautiful, " Our
Father in the Heavens." I do not cease to admire that prayer
Our Father, not of the earth, but universal ; for the Greek word is
not at all heaven as a locality, as you well know.
Yours Cordially,
E. P. Powell.
To the Eilitor of The Open Court :
—
I H.WE been greatly interested in your criticism of F. E.
Abbot's "Ground of all Liberal Religion." It seems to me he
confounds Nature and God. He says, "Scientific Theology de-
clares it is impossible to know Nature in any degree without
knowing God precisely in the same degree."
I am an Agnostic—or one who will not say hs believes a
thing unless he has a scientific reason for such belief—yet I have
a "comprehension of the modern Monism which conceives God
(or the All ; the Unknown behind phenomena) as immanent in
Nature" ; but I cannot agree with his views as quoted above.
A knowledge of Nature is after all but a small knowledge of
certain facts, or what we call facts, which we classify as best
we may. Nature may be the work of a supreme intelligence, or,
to use Mr. Abbot's words, of an "Omnipresent Self-c:nscious
Energy '
; but it does not follow that to know a work is to know
the worker. If Mr. Abbot insists that it is, then the " worker" in
this case has in his work, "red in tooth and claw," most unac-
countably left us in the dark as to his motives in placing us in a
world to full of woe—woe so bitter to sensitive minds.
It he would reply this is because we do not know, I answer
this is just what I say, and that no further mundane e.\perience
will help us to know more.
" The progress of natural knowledge is itself," he says, " the
ever-progressive revelation of the Immanent God." Certainly not,
I reply. It is but an increase of experience in the action and
working of laws in the environment of which we live.
Bristol, England. W. A. Leon.\rd.
Editorial Comment.
It may be, as Mr. Leonard says, that Dr. F. E. Abbot "con-
founds Nature and God," and it may be that, from the standpoint
of our correspondent, we are open to the same charge. Whatever
are our differences concerning the idea of God, in that point we are
one with Dr. Abbot.
The words " God " and " Nature,", as I use the terms, are not
identical, yet I would say that God and Nature are inseparable,
they are one indivisible whole.
When we speak of '
'
Nature, " we think of the world with refer-
ence to its physical laws chiefly. We see before our mental eye
mountains and forests, minerals and plants, animals and men, and
human institutions, from which the word Nature has been ab-
stracted and which embraces them all. But if we speak of "God,"
we think of those facts of nature's life chiefly, that are at the bottom
of its evolution, of those facts that have produced all that is great
and noble and good, for they are the conditions still of our ideal
aspirations and make their realization possible.
God and Nature were formerly considered as two separate
beings. We now look upon them as being one. God, accordingly,
means Nature, or the Cosmos, or the All, or the Universe con-
sidered in its ethical importance, considered as that power which
works out our future and as a matter of fact, constantly elevates,
enhances, and ennobles life. This power is no unknown or un-
knowable thing ; the laws of its manifestation are perfectly ascer-
tainable, and a society in which these laws are not obeyed, will
hopelessly rot away and perish.
Nature and God, as we conceive them, are ideas equal in their
circumscription. They cover the same field of facts
;
yet they are
different in so far as each of the two expressions makes different
features more prominent.
The words "my house," "my residence," "my home," are
three expressions, it may be, for the very same thing to a man who
owns the building in which he lives. Y'et each of these words
makes a different feature more prominent without positively exclud-
ing the others. He says " My house, " when thinking of it as the
building he owns ; he says " My residence" when thinking of it
as the rooms in which he resides, and he says " My home " when
thinking of the seat of his family-relations and all the pleasant
remembrances connected therewith. For different purposes we
would employ different expressions, and yet in reality they may
signify one and the same thing.
Thus also, God and Nature are one, and yet they are different.
God is nature, and nature is God. Yet by nature we understand
God's life and manifestations in their roughest outline only, in so
far as they are palpable to every living being. However, by God
we mean more than the word Nature conveys ; we mean chiefly the
still and grand and powerful workings of nature, almost invisible
to mortal eye, yet plainly perceptible to the knowing, in their awful
majesty and holiness. P. c.
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BOOK REVIEWS.
The Tartuffian Age. By Paul Mantegazza . From the Italian by
W. A Nettleton. Boston : Lee & Shepard.
A disquisition upon hypocrisy. The TartufBan principle, Mr,
Mantegazza seems to think, is one o£ the fundamental properties
of living substance. His researches are not confined to human
society. He begins %.ii.n animals and seeks the Tartuffe in cats,
butterflies, and fishes. But his investigations have the color of
literature. He is not a scientist. He believes that hypocrisy is
a function, a faculty, innate in animate creation. To Mr. Man-
tegazza, the butterfly assumes the hue of the leaves of the forest
in which it lives, not because that transformation was the condi-
tion of the preservation of its species, but because the butterfly is
Tartuffian, and possesses some recondite organ of hypocrisy. And
he triumphantly generalizes from this and similar facts that the
Tartuffian principle is universal, inherent in every protoplasmic
manifestation upon earth. Mr. Mantegazza is a dualist.
When the author is purely literary he is at his best. His por-
trayals of the deceptions of human society from the cradle to the
grave, when not marred by monotonous fervor, are excellent, and
sustain his reputation as a writer. If he were a despot, here, for
example, is what he would enact; "In all the domain of the
Kingdom of Sincerity the use of superlatives is absolutely forbid-
den, these being properly only suitable for the savage races and
for the babes of civilization. Every superlative used in conversa-
tion shall be punished with forced labor. Hyper-superlatives,
laudatory hyperboles, and all other similar fulsome verbal com-
pliments shall be reckoned as equivalent to homicide, and accord-
ingly punishable by death or by hard labor for life." The book
is well translated. jiKpK.
In the Rev2t€ philosophiqiie, for January, MM. C. Secretan,
R. Bourdon, and Adrien Naville contribute, in the order given,
the following essays: " L'economique et la philosophie " ; "La
certitude"; and " Remarques sur I'induction dans les sciences
physiques." Professors Lorabroso and Ottolenghi reply to M.
Binet's criticism, in a former number, of their work in hypnotism.
M. Beaunis reviews at length Liebault's " Le Sommeil provoque,"
M. Rodier does the same for Paulhan's " L'Activite mentale et les
elements de I'esprit, " and M. Hericourt likewise for Richet's ' ' Cha-
leur Animale." (io8 Boulevard St. Germain, Paris.)
"By far the greater part of the declaration of principles set
forth by the Nationalist party," says Francis A. Walker in the
^//a«//ir tI/okM/)', "consists in the denunciation of competition
Mr, Bellamy declares that competition is but the expression of the
' devil's maxim, " Your necessity is my opportunity," ' It may be
so, for his Satanic Majesty is reputed a very sensible and sagacious
gentleman ; but it is God's maxim as well."
An excellent resume may be obtained of current conceptions
of the limits of English fiction by a perusal of the symposiac
" Candour in Fiction," in the present month's New Rfview. The
discussion is conducted by M -. Walter Besant, Mrs. Lynn Linton,
and Mr, Thomas Hardy,
" Life among the Congo Savages," by Mr. Herbert Ward, in
the February Scrilnier's, may be read with profit ; the illustrations
of negro types show with remarkable c'earness the points empha-
sized by Professor Cope in the discussion of the negro problem in
No, 126 of The Open Court,
IVide-Awake for February contains a charming and edifying
Grecian tale by Adeline A. Knight, describing "boyhood in
Athens, "
Mr, John P, Dunning, late correspondent at Samoa for the
Associated Press, graphically retells, in the February Si . Nkholas,
the story of the great storm in the harbor of Samoa.
NOTES.
Professor Preyer contributes to the last Natunvissensch'jftUdie
IVochenschrift a concise review of what science has accomplished
in the investigation of the physiology of protoplasm.
Professor Fisher, in the third paper of the Cenlury series on
"The Nature and Method of Revelation," describes the differ-
entiating of Christianity from Judaism, and devotes a good deal of
space to the work of the Apostle Paul. Professor Fisher says
that Paul ' ' took a stand at Jerusalem like that which Luther took
at Worms," He adds that "but for Paul there would be no
Luther."
In the Alheiueuin of December 28 there was an unfavorable
review of Canon Rawlinson's " History of Phoenicia." The re-
viewer stated that the greater part of the historical section of the
book was "borrowed from the works of Movers (spelt Movers
throughout the book) and Kenrick," Unfortunately the man's
name was Movers, not Movers 1 In the Academy of January 4
Professor Sayce reviews the same book more mercifully. But, he
writes, "we miss that extensive acquaintance with the modern
literature of his subject which the student of ancient history is
now in the habit of demanding, , , , Even the classical work of
Movers is not only not quoted in his notes, but is not even men-
tion- d in the list of authorities at the end of the volume," Movers
died in 1856 !
Mistakes are made even in the best journals.
The £//«'<:«/ j'v'd'a!/-!/ protests against Dr, F. E Abbot's remark
that the Ethical Movement is seeking " to establish itself upon an
Agnostic foundation," From the context of Dr. Abbot's remarks
we cannot but believe he meant that the Ethical Movement is
seeking to establish ethics upon no basis whatsoever. He complains
about their philcsophical and religious indifference and declares
that ethics needs a firm foundation or it will become mere con-
ventionalism and moral sentimentality.
Dr. Abbot says :
"No ethical enthusiasm which is empty of a scientific idea
can long sustain itself in the wide turmoil of modern thought.
Without a reason, ethics itself must die down into mere custom or
convention. The ideas of reason and of right are Siamese twins
The ' ethical passion,' if it contain not the ethical idea, is the weak-
est passion of the human soul—has in itself no more continuance
or abiding life than a beautiful cut flower."
The Ethical Y^t-civi/ says that the ethical movement is "the
building up of practical righteousness in the world," and all who
sympathize with this aim are invited to join "whatever maybe
their theological or philosophical opinions," The ethical move-
ment is " founded wholly and solely on the ficts of the moral life."
But what are the facts of moral life ? Are we to understand
by the facts of moral life that which popular sentiment by custom
and convention calls " moral." As soon as we attempt to give a
clear and precise, an exact or scientific, definition of that which
must be considered as 'the facts of the moral life,' we have to go
down to some philosophical foundation of morals. What does
ethics mean but the science of morals, the philosophy of conduct ?
And an ethical society, in order to be true to its own principles,
should above all seek to establish itself upon a solid philosophical
basis.
N. B.
—
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